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Introduction * For a rising power like China, soft power and image management are essential aspects of its diplomacy. Soft power has to make China's rise palatable to the world and has to create understanding, regard and ultimately support for China's political model and policies. It has to help China to win friends and allies, and to advance the country's agenda. It is therefore no surprise that building and projecting soft power have been put firmly on China's international agenda, including its agenda for Europe. Although China's soft power has serious limits, the country and its policies attract much interest in Europe: developments in China top European agendas and fill newspaper pages; governments, businessmen and scholars are discussing the challenges and opportunities that their countries face vis-à-vis a rising China; Chinese cultural festivals and exhibitions draw large numbers of visitors; and an increasing number of young Europeans are learning Chinese in school. Everybody in Europe is watching China and everybody-well informed or not-has an opinion about China. These opinions are often ambiguous: on many issues, in particular political matters, perceptions are negative; but at the same time Europeans seem intrigued by, and attracted to, China.
One of the questions that arises when looking at China's image and influence in Europe is to what extent this image is based on China's soft power. Is Europe's attraction to China shaped by China's culture and political values or is Europe mainly attracted to China's growing economic might and international stature? In cases of the latter, should that be considered soft power?
In order to explore the relation between China's soft power and China's influence in Europe, this Clingendael Diplomacy Paper looks at perceptions of China's soft power in three European countries: France; Germany; and the United Kingdom. It analyses the projection of China's soft power towards Europe, in particular by means of public diplomacy, and discusses obstacles to building and projecting soft power in Europe at both the sender's (China) and the receiver's (Europe) side. On the sender's side, these obstacles include China's lack of credibility and legitimacy, and its misconceptions about European values. On the receiver's side, preconceived notions and expectations of China form an obstacle, as they make European audiences less-willing receivers of China's projected soft power. The paper subsequently analyses perceptions on the basis of the results of various polls about China in the three European countries. It explores the possibility of explaining changes and differences in European perceptions of China by looking at the development and character of the relationship between the three countries and by placing perceptions of China in the context of major international events.
The Sender's Side: China's Wielding of Soft Power in Europe
The Chinese Discourse on Soft Power
China is well aware of the importance of improving internationally held perceptions by projecting soft power and is actively exploring the concept's possibilities. The term 'soft power' has found its way into China's academic discourse, as well as into the speeches and documents of China's highest leaders. 1 The term 'soft power' was mentioned, for example, by Communist Party Secretary-General Hu Jintao in one of the most important and broadly endorsed documents of China's political system: his report to the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of China. Various government organizations-such as ministries, the State Council Information Office and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)-are discussing ways to exercise China's soft power by means of public diplomacy. However, it is the academic debate on soft power and public diplomacy strategies that has been expanding and deepening most rapidly in the past few years. Chinese academic works were initially focused on introducing and evaluating the concept of soft power as it was put forward by Joseph Nye, but soon they took the discussion one step ahead to analysing critically and developing Nye's ideas by adapting them to suit China's situation. 3 China has come to see soft power as a fundamental component of its comprehensive national power, which includes economic, military and political power. In the words of Tsinghua University's Professor Yan Xuetong, 'during a period of globalization, the sphere of competition is no longer about land, resources or markets but rule-making, setting regulations, norms or customs'. 4 China wants to play a role in establishing these rules and norms. Building soft power is a way to advance China's domestic and international agenda, to guard Beijing against criticism, and to boost the country's international standing.
A notable difference between the Chinese and international discourses is that officials and academics in China have from the start discussed soft power and public diplomacy in the domestic as much as in the international context. 5 The public diplomacy department of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, mainly organizes activities to inform domestic, not international, audiences about China's foreign policy and diplomacy. The domestic aspect is also clearly indicated in the above-mentioned speech by President Hu, who declared soft power not only a major component of national comprehensive power but also an 'important source for national cohesion '. 6 In their discussion of soft power and public diplomacy, Chinese policymakers pay much attention to the role of the media in enhancing or damaging the country's image. Beijing is deeply sensitive to foreign perceptions of China and its policies abroad. Both foreign appraisals of China's diplomatic performance and negative perceptions of China Most officials and many academics see China's traditional culture as the most important resource for building soft power. 9 China's culture has a long history of holding great attraction to the West. In imperial times, China's high civilization and accompanying values were not imposed in any way on the outside world, but wherever foreign traders and envoys told their stories about the Middle Kingdom, people felt attracted. In the view of many in China, Chinese culture today has more to offer than visual arts, music and literature alone; it may also provide appealing alternative values in addressing international problems. Many Chinese people see potential in the traditional Chinese value of 'harmony', which could prove useful in addressing cultural clashes, and the corresponding value of 'harmony between nature and humankind', which could be used when confronting environmental problems.
10 Furthermore, harmony is directly linked with the official cornerstone of China's foreign policy: the theory of a Harmonious World (hexie shijie) which promotes China as a stable, reliable and responsible economic partner, a rising economic power that does not have to be feared. these resources, China's soft power has serious shortcomings. 13 Yan Xuetong, for example, stresses the need to strengthen China's 'institutions and social justice' as a basis for soft power.
14 Others point out that China is mainly importing books and academic works and concepts from abroad and hardly exports any. They see this as an illustration of the lack of Chinese ideas and values that are of interest for the outside world. 15 The so-called 'Beijing Consensus' 16 is often mentioned as an example of how China's political values are an important source of China's soft power in developing countries in Africa and Latin America. However, the 'Beijing Consensus' is not relevant for the case of Europe, and, moreover, has been more the subject of Western debates than of the Chinese discourse. The majority of both officials and scholars are reluctant to promote the Chinese experience as a model that should be followed by others. They assert that it is too early to conclude whether the model works well and stress that each country must find its own path.
The Goals and Contents of China's Soft Power Projection towards Europe
Enhancing ties with the European Union (EU) and individual European countries, and improving China's image in Europe, are part of China's overall foreign policy of building and strengthening relations with 'great powers'. China has been strengthening its soft-power projection by rapidly developing public diplomacy strategies. In addition to redressing incidents and negative news, these strategies serve four major goals. First, China wants to be seen as a country that strives to build a harmonious society and that works hard to give its people a better future. It seeks understanding for, and recognition of, its political system and policies. Second, China wants to be seen as a stable, reliable and responsible economic partner, a rising economic power that does not have to be feared. This is the crux of China's policy of good neighbourliness and the 'harmonious world' and 'peaceful rise' strategies. Third, Beijing wants China to be seen as a trustworthy and responsible member of the international political community, capable of and willing to contribute actively to world peace. Lastly, China wants to be acknowledged and respected as an ancient but vibrant culture.
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Translated into domestic and pragmatic terms, China's public diplomacy has to boost the Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy as China's central ruler and 'serve the need of sustainable and steady economic and social development at home'. 19 China's public diplomacy in Europe focuses in the first place on building political trust by improving the image of China's political system, its foreign policies and the human rights situation. Europe is very concerned about China's domestic conditions; much more so, it appears, than the United States. 20 China recognizes Europe as a normative power and knows that human rights are a cornerstone of many European countries' foreign policies. It is therefore not surprising that building political trust is more prominent in China's public diplomacy in Europe then elsewhere in the world. 21 Second, China's public diplomacy in Europe addresses increasing fears of China's economic rise and tries to lure foreign investment. The EU is China's biggest trading partner and China's overall economic and trade interests in Europe are considerable. Beijing's public diplomacy needs to counter the rising European criticism of the increasing EU-China trade deficit and of Chinese trade barriers, and seeks to convince European audiences that (1) China's economic development offers opportunities for business and (2) that China deserves market-economy status.
Chinese embassies in major European capitals translate these overall goals into a more detailed public diplomacy strategy that is fine-tuned to the local situation. Chinese diplomats in European capitals are courting the local media and increasingly speak out on television and in local newspapers. China's leaders realize that more understanding of Chinese culture and ideas are an absolute prerequisite for acceptance by the international community. They feel that the negative views are mainly the result of lack of knowledge or misunderstanding of Chinese values and of the difficulties confronting China. As former Chinese President Jiang Zemin noted, 'it is absolutely necessary to know the basic Chinese values in order to have a good understanding of what has happened and what will happen in China'. 22 Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi wants to 'enable the general public in other countries to know China better', so that they 'better appreciate and support China's domestic and foreign policies'.
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The Chinese side often points out that the EU and China share many ideas on dealing with international issues: visions of a multi-polar world; a strong aversion to military action to solve crises; and a preference for a more balanced international order that is based on multilateralism. Both China and the EU advocate a leading role to be played by the United Nations, and they see China and Europe confronted with issues that 'require concerted efforts to cope with 
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[…], such as the issues of globalization, climate change, terrorism, nuclear nonproliferation and epidemic diseases'. 24 Although lack of knowledge about China among European publics 25 is certainly an important factor leading to negative European views of China, it is not the most important obstacle. A bigger problem is the enormous gap between European and Chinese ideas and values, 26 a factor that Chinese policy-makers often fail to grasp. There is less commonality in political thinking than perceived by the Chinese side. Beijing does not realize how deeply European societies are permeated by the values of democracy, human rights, rule of law and fundamental principles such as freedom of speech and freedom of demonstration, even if European societies' governments are willing to take a more pragmatic approach to ensure a country's material interests. Both sides may agree on international political goals such as multi-polarity, multilateralism and democratization, but their understanding of what exactly these concepts mean differs considerably. The Chinese have a realist, state-centric understanding of multilateralism; for the Europeans, multilateralism involves the sharing of sovereignty. 27 The Chinese discourse on democratization focuses on responsibility, responsiveness and government accountability; 28 while Europe regards it as a broad system that involves free media, an independent judiciary, rule of law and full respect for civil rights. These gaps in thinking cannot simply be explained away by providing European publics with more information. A long-term dialogue is needed to create understanding in Europe for the Chinese way of thinking. The media can, in principle, play an important role in this process, but-as discussed below-in China's case the media's effectiveness as a communicator to Western audiences is limited. The Receiving Side: European Perceptions
European perceptions of China are obviously heavily influenced by China's economic and political rise. China represents many opportunities as well as challenges for Europe in the economic realm. China offers a major export market, a destination for investment and production and a pool of cheap labour, but the country is also a competitor on foreign export markets and in the quest for resources. Furthermore, Europe is faced with a growing trade deficit with China and is unhappy about China's trade barriers, currency policy and enforcement of intellectual property rights. In the political realm, Europe considers China an important global player that has to be engaged and carefully guided into the international community by constant encouragement to step up its reforms, adopt internationally accepted norms and values and improve its domestic human rights situation. Europe realizes that many of today's problems, including the financial crisis and energy and climate change, require joint global action in which China has an important role to play. Perceptions of China vary significantly per European country. This paper looks at just three of them: Germany; France; and the United Kingdom. The countries are selected because they are of political and economic significance to China, there is polling data available for all three, and their relations with China are well documented. The perception of China and of China's projected soft power within these three countries varies per target group, but as the available 11 polling results do not differentiate between these groups, this paper will focus on perceptions of the general public.
Measuring European Perceptions of China
There is no satisfactory way to measure a country's soft power. Soft power is not tangible and the results of changes in a country's soft power are only visible over time. There are a number of measurement instruments to indicate the success of a country's soft power, of which the opinion poll is regarded as the most useful because it is not limited to one aspect of soft power or to one specific target group. Other instruments include media analysis, number of tourists that visit China, number of foreign students in China and Chinese-language students in other countries, and data on the number and popularity of Chinese cultural events abroad. This paper mainly uses opinion polls to explore and indicate European perceptions of China's soft power. As discussed extensively elsewhere, 29 there are certain limitations to the use of opinion polls as an instrument to measure perceptions. Opinion poll outcomes are influenced by: (1) sample selection; (2) the way that questions are formulated and framed; and (3) the timing of the interview. People's perceptions are unstable and easily influenced by the spur of the moment. Table 1 , which is based on a 2008 survey by the Financial Times and Harris, illustrates this fluidity: it shows considerable fluctuations in perceptions of China within short periods of time. The survey asked people on a monthly basis which country, if any, from a given list of countries was perceived as the greatest threat to global stability. In some cases the shifts in perceptions over the course of the year can be traced back to events in China. For example, the rise in apprehension about China in April 2008 is plausibly the result of China's crackdown of the riots in Tibet in mid-March and the subsequent negative media reporting on China. 30 One month later, China's swift and adequate reaction to the Sichuan earthquake, which was widely praised in the world press, likely contributed to the decrease in threat perception that is shown in the May 2008 results. In September 2008, however, the significant decrease in percentages of people in Germany and France who perceived China as a threat should be attributed to an event elsewhere in the world, for at this time Russia's invasion of Georgia temporarily shifted fears from China to Russia. The fact that Russia suddenly topped the list of countries in the survey supports this assumption. A similar 'external cause' may partially explain China's positive image earlier in this decade, because the fact that global attention was focused on negative feelings towards the United States after they started the 
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Overall Perceptions of China
Opinion polls found that at the beginning of the decade, a majority of people surveyed in the three European countries had a relatively favourable image of China. 31 In recent years, however, China's popularity has been slipping. As Table  2 In the polls quoted above, respondents are not asked to explain their opinions. The figures therefore do not tell us much about why people have negative feelings about China and why they have changed their minds over time. The brief overview at the end of this section of bilateral relations between China and the European countries surveyed, and analysis of the results of more specific polling questions below, provide clues for further interpretation.
Perceptions of China's Growing Influence
Many people in Europe think that China will one day replace the United States as a superpower: roughly 50 per cent in the three surveyed countries according to Pew's 2008 poll. Interestingly, 15 per cent in France holds the opinion that China has already replaced the United States. Around one-third thinks China will never replace the US. In another poll, where a similar question is asked but then with the target date of 2020, it is mainly the French (47 per cent) that expect China to be the dominant power in 2020; the British and Germans are far less optimistic.
For many, China's rise translates into China's growing influence in their country. In 2008, a majority of those surveyed said that China is having a great deal or fair amount of influence on their country: 54 per cent in the United Kingdom; 61 per cent in France; and 55 per cent in Germany. 34 Only a small group thinks that China's influence is good; more people think of it negatively (Table 3) . Table 4 ). When asked about the impact of China's growing economy, more people in the three countries think that China's growing economy is a 'bad thing' rather than a 'good thing' for their own country (see Table 5 ), and majorities think that China is a competitor rather than a partner of their own country (see Table 6 ). When asked whether China represents more of an economic opportunity or an economic threat, a small majority in the United Kingdom regards China as an opportunity. In Germany and France the results were the opposite: far more people regard China as an economic threat than as an opportunity (see Table 7 ). 
The Impact of the Economic Crisis
While new polls are not yet available, it can be expected that these perceptions may currently be undergoing another change. Since the economic and financial turmoil has taken the world in its grip, positions and perceptions are shifting and China suddenly stands out more positively. China holds the world's largest foreign currency reserves-1.9 trillion US dollars-and the stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen appear to suffer less from the crisis than stock markets elsewhere. Although the Chinese economy is hit hard by the fall in exports and millions of Chinese factory workers are losing their jobs, China is expected to be able to keep generating economic growth in the coming years. The world, including Europe, is thus looking towards China to play a major role in solving the crisis and many countries have knocked on Beijing's door for financial support. China has so far acted constructively, and in this light China's relatively positive financial situation has become a resource of soft power. Beijing clearly exploited this position during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's European 'Tour of Confidence' in January and February 2009. Wherever he went, Premier Wen stressed China's confidence in its own policies and economic situation, its willingness to take responsibility in helping to solve the crisis and its readiness to cooperate with the international community in dealing with the crisis. 41 He also made sure that he fine-tuned his messages to the nature of each country's economic relationship with China. In Germany, for example, he focused on trade and technological cooperation. In London, Premier Wen mainly discussed financial cooperation and, with the London financial summit of April 2009 in mind, the need for reform of the global financial system.
42
Perceptions of China's Foreign Policy and Diplomacy
In the field of international relations, different ethics and ideals regularly lead to clashes between China and Europe. China's foreign policy is still largely based on the norms that were summarized in the 1950s in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: national sovereignty and territorial integrity; non-aggression; peaceful coexistence; non-intervention in another country's internal affairs; and equality and mutual benefit. Although Chinese leaders realize and accept that some of these Westphalian concepts have become less valid in today's globalized world and are slowly introducing normative considerations into their foreign policies, these developments are not going fast enough for the European public. China's adherence to the principle of non-intervention in dealing with oppressive regimes collides with Western morality and the idea of the responsibility of humanitarian intervention. Europe accuses Beijing of putting economic and political interests above humanitarian considerations and does not yet have much confidence in China as a responsible stakeholder in the world. Strong majorities in the three surveyed European countries hold the view that China acts unilaterally and does not have much, or indeed any, consideration for the interests of other countries (see Table 8 ). These poll results illustrate the concern of European audiences with regard to China's foreign policy and diplomacy. Although Beijing has taken a number of steps to reform its foreign policy, and European leaders and scholars acknowledge that China increasingly contributes to global security and stability, European general publics remain to be convinced of China's goodwill.
Perceptions of China's Political Values
The he can cast a ballot'. 44 But the idea that China is still a developing country, and hence should be allowed to give less priority to political and civil rights, bounces back on the wall of ideas that are prevalent in Europe-and the West in generalsuch as the need to respect fully human rights, independent of any developmental stage. Furthermore, European publics mainly see images of the developed coastal provinces and the rich and cosmopolitan cities of Beijing and Shanghai. They read in the newspapers that Chinese foreign currency reserves are the biggest in the world and find it difficult to accept China's claim that it is still a developing country.
Most Europeans hold the opinion that European governments should speak out about possible human rights abuses in China (see Table 10 ). Polls on the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing are another indicator of European perceptions of China's policies and political situation. From the moment that Beijing won the Olympic bid, the Beijing Games have been closely linked with the situation in Tibet and China's lack of human rights. This was partially a result of Beijing's promise that hosting the Olympics would bring progress in China's human rights situation, but also of the media attention that human rights organizations and Tibet lobby groups attracted in the run-up to the event. The Olympic Games were regarded as an important event by Europeans. When people had to choose the three most significant events of 2008, the Olympic Games in Beijing were often mentioned and ended higher in the three countries than, for example, the military conflict between Russia and Georgia. 47 The 2008 Pew poll shows that half of the respondents in the United Kingdom and Germany approved of the decision to hold the Olympics in China, but that a majority in France thought that it was a bad decision (see Table 11 ). 
Perceptions of China's Culture
As noted earlier, Chinese policy-makers regard culture as the most important source of China's soft power. President Hu has publicly called for the enhancement of culture as a part of China's soft power, 49 and in summer 2007 the CPPCC held a special meeting on the topic of China's culture as a major resource for building China's soft power. 50 These policy statements are clearly put into practice in the case of Europe. China has furthermore established a considerable number of Confucius Institutes in Europe, including ten in France, nine in Germany and seventeen in the United Kingdom. 52 To what extent they will really become a force in promoting Chinese culture is too early to tell; at the moment they mainly focus on providing Chinese-language classes. In all three countries, an increasing number of elementary and middle schools include Chinese in their language curriculum. The number of European students of the Chinese language has been on the rise for years and is still booming. 
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Analysis of the Poll Results
The poll findings used for this paper do not provide us with detailed and clear-cut answers to the question of how the various elements of China's soft power are perceived in the three European countries under survey: the United Kingdom, France and Germany. Other than the 'Soft Power in Asia' poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, the surveys conducted in Europe were not specifically focused on the topic of 'soft power' and were not as detailed. In spite of these limits, the available polls show certain trends in European perceptions of China. They also tell us something about the effectiveness of China's soft power. Conclusions can be drawn, in particular when polls by different organizations find similar trends. The differences in poll results between the three countries largely reflect the different character of their bilateral relationships with China, and a few words on these relations are therefore required.
The Three Major European Powers' Relationships with China
In the first half of this decade, the three European countries' relations with China all developed smoothly. Their government leaders at the time-Schröder, Blair and Chirac-generally put economic interests first and aimed to avoid controversial issues. In recent years, however, this situation has changed. While British Prime Minister Gordon Brown (from 2007 until the present) continued his predecessor Blair's pragmatic approach towards China, new leaders in Germany and France initiated a shift in their country's policy towards China.
When Angela Merkel took over as German Chancellor in 2005, she announced a foreign policy that is based on human rights. She cannot afford, however, to ignore Germany's commercial interests. The economic and trade relationship with China is of great importance for Germany, which has a strong business lobby. Germany is China's largest European trading partner and China is Germany's most important economic partner in Asia. Furthermore, China is Germany's second biggest export market outside Europe. In 2007, the value of Germany's exports to China-29.9 billion-was more than three times that of France and nearly six times that of the UK. Large percentages of people in Europe worry about China's economic influence on their country and are anxious about the consequences of China's economic growth for their country's employment and industry. 57 Here, again, the apprehension is biggest in France and Germany and lowest in the United Kingdom. In view of its large exports to China, this is not unexpected in the case of Germany. The figure for France is somewhat surprising, however, as SinoFrench trade has developed positively and France is the most confident of the three that the European economy can compete successfully with rising economies in Asia. The issue of product safety in China is a problem of enormous proportions for Beijing: the image that Chinese products are less safe seems strongly established in Europe. People in Europe are also concerned about China's military growth but they perceive China as neither an enemy nor as a military threat. This outcome is to be expected, as Europe and China do not share direct security interests. When asked about their perceptions of China in relation to global stability, a small minority in the three European countries answered that they perceive China as a threat. The outcomes of the polls confirm the importance of normative considerations in Europe. Large majorities in the three European countries are concerned about China's unilateral behaviour, the human rights situation and China's policy towards Tibet. Media attention in the run-up to the Olympic Games in Beijing raised awareness of these issues in Europe and strengthened negative feelings. Many Europeans agree with the statement that their leaders should speak out on human rights and that human rights should be linked to trade. The fact, however, that a considerable group in Germany remains against raising human rights issues when meeting with China's leaders is related to the big German economic and business stakes in China, as mentioned above.
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The Beijing Olympic Games as a tool to strengthen China's soft power have only been partially successful. The gains for China were the strengthening of its image as a powerful and capable country and as a country with a rich culture, but with regard to normative issues, the Olympics seem to have done more harm than good.
The Limits of China's Soft Power in Europe
The projection of China's soft power in Europe encounters a number of problems. China's messages do not enter neutral territory in Europe. China has to fight many negative perceptions and these are difficult to change. In particular, Europe's strong normative considerations pertaining to political and civil rights, and democracy, form a fundamental barrier against China's public diplomacy. These negative perceptions spring from conflicting values, preconceived notions, a lack of knowledge of China and its policies, and underlying fears of a rapidly rising power. Good public diplomacy can, to a certain extent, tackle these causes of negative image. Even when it comes to conflicting values, a long-term socialization process may contribute to more understanding for China's values. In order to become more effective, however, China's public diplomacy has to become more credible.
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The Main Obstacle to a Successful Chinese Public Diplomacy: The Lack of Credibility Lack of credibility is a major problem for China's public diplomacy. First, the problem concerns China's public diplomacy actors. In the words of journalism professor Gong Wenxiang: 'If the medium lacks credibility, it is unthinkable that it will improve the country's image'. 59 The issue of credibility is closely linked to the character of China's political system and its ideas about public diplomacy, which are largely based on a state-centred hierarchical model of diplomacy. In the state-centred model, the state is the major messenger of soft power. State organizations, however, are seldom trusted as messengers and China's government is trusted even less by foreign audiences. This is a consequence of the non-democratic nature of China's government and its opaque political decisionmaking, which raises questions about the legitimacy of the Chinese government to speak for its people. Furthermore, it is the result of the Chinese government's well-known use of propaganda 60 in recent history to deceive both its own population and the international community. China's government seeks to create and control the flow of information from China to the outside world in order to keep its dirty laundry out of public view and craft an ideal image of China. The idea that the image projected should be a perfect picture with little room for mistakes and ugliness, including for the diversity in society, is deeply embedded in China's culture.
These mechanisms of maintaining control over its society seriously hamper the growth of China's soft power and damage cautious international impressions that China is moving towards a more open society. At the same time, however, Beijing does acknowledge that non-state actors such as civil society organizations, business communities, universities, research institutions and individuals of standing have a role to play, 61 and in daily practice they are already doing so. the international community and by portraying a more genuine picture of China they become credible messengers. In challenging the limits of their academic or cultural freedom, they contribute to China's soft power by showing the world that there is plurality in China's society. Some explicitly recognize the need to leave the traditional approach behind, make the Chinese media more open and promote exchanges of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The scholar Yu Xintian, for example, sees the lack of internationally active NGOs in China as a 'blind spot' of Chinese soft power. 63 However, the role of non-state or independent actors in China's public diplomacy is still limited.
The majority of China's soft-power messengers are, in one way or another, censured by Beijing. This is particularly true for the instrument that China regards as most important for projecting its soft power: the Chinese media. Chinese Politburo Standing Committee Member Li Changchun recently called for strengthening of China's domestic and international communication capacity in order to 'promote China's cultural soft power'. 64 This call was soon followed by the announcement of plans to spend US$ 6.6 billion on extending China's international media outreach by creating a new international news channel that should be able to compete with CNN, Al Jazeera and the BBC. 65 The new television station should counter the negative coverage of China in the West and convey a positive image to the world by explaining China's view on world affairs. However, media are credible only when they are independent and adhere to journalistic ethics. A new generation of Chinese journalists aims at achieving these goals and the government sometimes turns a blind eye to their publications, but these journalists know that they always have to operate carefully and stay within certain political boundaries.
China's behaviour during the Beijing Olympic Games of August 2008 illustrates China's problem with credibility. Although successful in projecting the image of a capable and technologically advanced world power, the Olympic Games failed to increase China's credibility. In the eyes of most European observers, the promises by Chinese officials that the Games would help to advance human rights conditions in China were not fulfilled. On the contrary, controls over society were tightened, dissent was stifled and demonstrations were prevented or punished with arrests. Beijing had to be strongly reminded to give the foreign press the promised full access to the World Wide Web. It also provided reporters with incorrect information about the programme of the Olympic Games' opening ceremony. It was not the fact that the organizing committee had pre-recorded certain parts of the ceremony that led to indignation in Europe, but the fact that the committee had presented these parts as taking place live. The same was felt with regard to the young girl who was reported to have sung live, but later turned out to have lip-synched a song performed by a girl who was considered not beautiful enough to take the limelight. Chinese officials did not understand what the fuss was all about, but audiences worldwideinterestingly, including the Chinese public-felt betrayed and did not understand the Chinese government's pursuit of total perfection. These seemingly small incidents were reported all over the globe, confirming impressions that China's government cannot be trusted to tell the truth.
Perceptions of China: A Matter of Soft or Hard Power?
This paper looked at the projection of China's soft power, but many aspects of China's statecraft and diplomacy that are often interpreted as soft power are in fact based on China's economic and political might. In these cases it would be more appropriate to speak of the soft aspects of China's hard power rather than of soft power as defined by Joseph Nye. Although developing soft power has gradually gained prominence in China over the past decade, developing hard power is still a major component in strengthening China's comprehensive national power. In that sense it may be argued that China, like the United States, aims at becoming a 'smart power': a power that complements its economic and military weight with greater investments in soft power. 66 Gregory Treverton and Seth Jones suggest that, rather than divide power into 'hard' and 'soft', we should look at power 'along a continuum from coercion at one end, to persuasion or attraction at the other, with bribery or economic inducements perhaps in the middle'. 67 This approach may suit China's case best. In Europe, the centre of gravity of China's power is found somewhere in that middle. Europeans are not attracted by China's ideas and values, nor are they concerned about China's military hard power. China's power and influence in Europe are based on European expectations that Europe will benefit, both politically and economically, from expanding and deepening relations with China. 
